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MINIMAX-OPTIMAL STOP RULES AND DISTRIBUTIONS 
IN SECRETARY PROBLEMS 
BY THEODORE P. HILL1 AND ULRICH KRENGEL 
Georgia Institute of Technology and University of Gdttingen 
For the secretary (or best-choice) problem with an unknown number N 
of objects, minimax-optimal stop rules and (worst-case) distributions are 
derived, under the assumption that N is a random variable with unknown 
distribution, but known upper bound n. Asymptotically, the probability of 
selecting the best object in this situation is of order of (log n)-Y. For 
example, even if the only information available is that there are somewhere 
between 1 and 100 objects, there is still a strategy which will select the best 
item about one time in five. 
1. Introduction. In the classical secretary problem, a known number of 
rankable objects is presented one by one in random order (all n! possible 
orderings being equally likely). As each object is presented, the observer must 
either select it and stop observing or reject it and continue observing. He may 
never return to a previously rejected object, and his decision to stop must be 
based solely on the relative ranks of the objects he has observed so far. The 
goal is to maximize the probability that the best object is selected. This 
problem, also known as the marriage problem or best-choice problem, is well 
known, and the reader is referred to Freeman (1983) and Ferguson (1989) for 
a history and review of the literature. 
Suppose now that the total number of objects is not known, but is a random 
variable N taking values in {1, 2, .. , n}, where n is a known fixed positive 
integer. How should the observer play in order to guarantee the highest 
probability of selecting the best object, what is this probability and what is the 
worst distribution for N? The main goal of this paper is to determine these 
minimax-optimal stop rules, values and distributions as a function of n. For 
example, if n = 5, the strategy "stop with the first object with probability 
26/75; otherwise continue and stop with the second object with probability 
26/49 provided it is better than the first object; and otherwise stop the first 
time an object is observed which is better than any previously observed object" 
is minimax-optimal. This strategy will select the best object with probability at 
least 26/75 for all distributions of N (< 5), and that probability is best 
possible. Conversely, if N has the distribution P(N = 1) = 13/75, 
P(N = 2) = 2/75, P(N = 5) = 60/75, then no strategy will select the best 
object with probability greater than 26/75, so this distribution is also mini- 
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max. (It is assumed that, given N, all N! orderings are equally likely, and that 
if an object is rejected and no more objects remain, the game is over and the 
best object has not been selected.) 
A number of results are known for the general situation where the number 
of objects N is a random variable. Presman and Sonin (1972) derive optimal 
stop rules when N has a known prior distribution and mention the necessarily 
complex form ("islands") of optimal stop rules for certain prior distributions. 
Irle (1980) gives a concrete xample of such a prior for which the optimal stop 
rule has these islands and sufficient conditions for existence of simple "non- 
island" stop rules. Abdel-Hamid, Bather and Trustrum (1982) derive necessary 
and sufficient conditions for admissibility of randomized stop rules. 
Extensions to the situation where the interarrival times of the objects are 
continuous random variables with known distributions have been studied by 
Presman and Sonin (1972), Gianini and Samuels (1976) and Stewart (1981). 
More recently, Bruss (1984) and Bruss and Samuels (1987) derive surprising 
and very general minimax-optimal strategies in this same context and even for 
more general loss functions. In contrast to the minimax-optimal stop rules 
derived in this paper, which are based on knowledge of a bound for N, those of 
Bruss and Samuels are based on knowledge of the distributions of the continu- 
ous i.i.d. interarrival times; in this sense our results complement heirs. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains notation, results for 
the classical secretary problem and basic results concerning randomized stop 
rules; Section 3 contains the statements of the main results and examples; 
Sections 4 and 5 contain the proofs of the minimax-optimal stop rules and 
distributions, respectively; and Section 6 contains remarks and asymptotics. 
2. Preliminaries. A well-known equivalent formulation of the classical 
secretary problem is the following. R1, R2,..., Rn are independent random 
variables on a probability space (fQ, Y, P), where n is a fixed positive integer 
and P(RJ = i)=j 1for all i E {1, 2, ..., j} and all j E {1, 2,. ., n). If n- de- 
notes the stop rules for R1, R2,..., Rn, then the value of a stop rule t E E 
(given that there are n objects) is 
V(tIN = n) = P(Rt = 1 and Ri > 1 for all j > t); 
that is, V(tIN = n) is the probability of selecting the best object using the 
stop-rule strategy t, given that there are n objects. The goal is to find a t 
making V(tlN = n) as large as possible, and the solution to this problem is well 
known [cf. Ferguson (1989) and Freeman (1983)] and is recorded here for ease 
of reference. Throughout his paper, so = 0, and for j ? 1, s; = E 1i' 
DEFINITION 2.1. For each positive integer n, kn is the nonnegative integer 
satisfying 
Sn-1 - Skn-1 2 1 > Sn-1 - Skn 
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PROPOSITION 2.2. The stop rule tn E E defined by 4n = min{min{j > kn: 
Ri = 1}, n} is optimal, that is, 
V(tnIN= n) = sup V(tIN= n). 
t E En 
In other words, given that there are n objects, the optimal strategy is to 
observe the first kn objects without stopping and then to stop with the first 
object, if any, that is better than any object previously seen. It is well known 
that n/kn -* e as n - oo, and the next example records a few typical values 
of n. 
EXAMPLE 2.3. k1= k2 = O, k3 = k4 = 1, k5 = k6 = k7 = 2 and k8 = kg= 
k10 = 3. 
Next, the above notations will be generalized to the setting where the 
number of objects N is a random variable and randomized stop rules are 
allowed. (In the classical setting of a fixed known number of objects, it is clear 
that randomization does not help, that is, fn is also optimal among the larger 
class of randomized stop rules.) 
For each positive integer n, Hn denotes the set of probabilities on 
{1, 2 ..., n}, so P EH n is of the form p = (P1, P2, ... ., Pn) where pi 2 0 for all 
i and E=11pi=1. 
N is a random variable with distribution A(N) E I-Ing R1,... Rn are as 
above and independent of N and 5n denotes the set of randomized stop rules 
for R1,..., R n that is, t E En means that {t = i} is in the a-algebra gener- 
ated by R1, U1 ... ., Ri, Ui, where U1, U2, ... are i.i.d. U[O, 1] random variables 
which are independent of the {Ri} process and of N. In other words, the 
observer is allowed to base his selection rule not only on the observed relative 
ranks, but also on an independent event, say flipping a coin or using a random 
number generator. Clearly the only stop rules which are of interest (for the 
goal of selecting the best object) are those which never stop with an object 
which is not the best seen so far, so every "reasonable" t E En may be 
described by t = (q1, q2 .. ., qn) E [0, 1]n, where qi is the probability that 
t = i, given that Ri = 1 and t > i - 1. Accordingly, it will be assumed 
throughout hat only such stop rules are used, so En is essentially [0, 1]n. The 
stop rule t = (q1, q2 . . ., qn) describes the selection strategy "stop with the 
first object with probability q1 (i.e., if U1 < q1); otherwise continue observing 
and if the second object is better than the first, stop with probability q2 (i.e., 
U2 < q2); otherwise continue,..." [see Abdel-Hamid, Bather and Trustrum 
(1982)]. To relate this to the classical problem, Proposition 2.2 says that if 
N n, then an optimal stop rule is (O, ... ., 0 1,..., 1), where kn zeros precede 
n kn ones. [Formally speaking, the above stop rules (ql, ... qn) are not 
forced to stop by time n, but since stopping with a relative rank less than 1 is 
worth nothing, it is easily seen that forcing a stop by time n changes nothing.] 
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DEFINITION 2.4. For t = (q 1,. . ., qn) E 9 and p = (P1, . * *, PO) E fn, the 
value of using t given that the distribution of N is p, V(tlp), is given by 
V(tlp) = P(t < N and Rt = 1 and Ri > 1 
V i E ft + 19t +29 . . . N) l(N) = p). 
(Recall the assumption that if the observer rejects the jth object and N =jg 
then he loses.) 
The next lemma is found in Abdel-Hamid, Bather and Trustrum (1982) and 
is recorded here for completeness. (For notational convenience, the product 
over an empty set is taken to be 1.) 
LEMMA 2.5. For t = (q19 q2 ... * qn) E 5n and p = (P1, ... ,Pn) E Hn 
n i i-1 
V(tlp) = Epj-E qi H (1 - m-1qm). 
j=1 i= m= 
PROOF. Using t, the probability that all of the first m objects will be 
rejected, r(t, m), is 
r(t, m) = (1 - ql)(1 - q2/2) ... (1 - qm/m) 
and if N = j, the probability of winning with this rule t is V(tIN = j)= 
j-lEj= lqir(t, i - 1). Since V(tlp) = E>1= lpjV(tlN =j), this yields the desired 
equality. a 
3. Main theorems and examples. Recall that sj = Ei=li-l and k is the "cutoff' for the optimal rule in the classical secretary problem with n 
,objects (Definition 2.1 and Proposition 2.2). 
DEFINITION 3.1. Let a, = 1, a2 = 1/2 and, for n > 2, 
=Sn- - Skn-1 
(n - kn)/kn + (sn-1 Skn-l)Skn 
(See Table 1 for an , n = 3, 4, 5, 10.) 
Recall also that En is the set of randomized stop rules for n objects, Hfn is 
the set of probabilities on {1, . .. , n} and V(tlp) is the probability of selecting 
the best object using t, given that the distribution of the number of objects is 
p. The following three theorems are the main results of this paper. 
THEOREM A. supte n infps T, V(tlp) = a = infp,=- supret V(tlp). 
REMARK. Although each of the terms in the definition of an has a natural 
probabilistic interpretation (e.g., si - s; is the expected number of relative 
rank 1 candidates occurring between the ith and jth candidates), the authors 
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know of no intuitive explanation why an should be the minimax constant 
appearing in Theorem A. 
THEOREM B (Minimax-optimal stop rule). If tn = (q1.*, q *) E 3n is 
defined by 
q J (ac - _s_)- fiorj = 1, k* , 
1 forkn <j < n, 
then V(t*lp) ? a,- for all p E fin 
THEOREM C (Minimax-optimal distribution for N). If Pn* = (pr, n, p*) E 
fin is defined by 
(an(i + 1) forj < kn, 
Pj= an(1 - (Sn-1 skn-1) ) forj = kn 
0 forkn <j < n 
(so for n < 2, pn = 1 and for n > 2, p* = nan[kn(Sn-1 - Skn-)I 1)) then 
V(tI Pn*) < an for all t E En .
[Verification of the above expression for pn* and of the fact that q?' E [0, 1] 
is left to the reader; this requires only elementary algebra applied to the 
definitions of an, kn and sn. For example, to show q ? < 1 the monotonicity 
of the {s)} implies that it is enough to show that an < (1 + Skn- 1), and using 
the definition of a n and sj this is equivalent to (kn - 1)(snl - Skn-1) < n - 
kn, which clearly holds.] 
Table 1 lists the minimax values {fa}, and the minimax-optimal stop rules 
and distributions for several values of n. 
REMARKS. Irle's (1980) example of an "unpleasant" distribution, that is, a 
distribution for which no stop rule of the form (0,0, ... , 0, 1, 1,..., 1) is 
optimal, is p = (0, 0.895, 0.001, 0.001, ... , 0.001, 0.1) E H8, for which he calcu- 
lates the value of the optimal stop rule (0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) to be approximately 
TABLE 1 
n kn ?h tn* = (q *,...qn) P.* Pl@@P 
1 0 1 (1) (1) 
2 0 2 (1,1) (0,o1) 
3 1 3 (7 7,1,1) - 6 
4 2 26 26( , 26 1, 1 . (25 13 2 29) 605 2 75 75,49' , 4 , U (73,75'"75 75) 
10 3 0.278+ (0.278+, 0.386+, 0.478+, 1, 1,...,1) (0.139+, 0.092+, 0.068+, 0,0,...,0, 0.698+) 
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0.482. Comparison of this value with those in Table 1 suggests that such 
island distributions are far from being worst-case (i.e., minimax-optimal), 
although a direct proof of this is not known to the authors. 
It should also be observed that the minimax-optimal distribution for N is 
not one of the other "naive-guess" distributions uch as N n or N uni- 
formly distributed on {1, 2, ... ., n} or N = 1 with probability p and = n with 
probability 1 - p. As far as the authors know, this Pn* is a new distribution on 
n points. 
Clearly Theorem A follows from Theorems B and C. No direct proof that 
sup inf = inf sup is known to the authors; although V(tlp) is linear in p and 
fln is convex and compact, V(tlp) is neither convex nor concave in t, and 
known generalizations of the classical minimax theorem of game theory do not 
seem to apply. (The results in this paper may also be interpreted as a zero-sum 
two-person game as follows. Player I picks the distribution of N, and player II 
picks the stop-rule or selection-strategy t; if t selects the best of the N objects, 
then player I pays player II one dollar; and otherwise no money changes 
hands. The constant an then represents the value of this game.) 
4. Proof of Theorem B. The conclusions of Theorems B and C are 
trivial for n = 1 and easy for n = 2, so for the remainder of this paper, n will 
be a fixed integer strictly bigger than 2, and to simplify notation, k = kn, 
`= En and II = Hn. (Observe that n > 2 precludes the degenerate cases 
where k = 0; see Example 2.3.) 
LEMMA 4.1. Suppose {a iY11 are real numbers, and j and k are positive 
integers satisfying n ? j 2 k. If both 
(1) (a1 + .a kak)/, 2 (a1 + .+aj)/ 
and 
(2) am2am+l forallmE{+k 1, k + 2, ... ,n), 
then (a1 + ... +aj)/j ? (a1 + ... +an)/n. 
PROOF. If j = n, the conclusion is trivial, so assume j < n. Then condi- 
tions (1) and (2), respectively, imply 
(a1 + *. +aj)/j 2 (ak+1 + *. +aj)/(j -k 
? (aj+l + * ?+an)/(n -j), 
so (a, + + aj)/j 2 (a, + +a n)/n. E 
PROPOSITION 4.2. 
sup inf V(tlp) = max min V(tIN =j). 
tE 5 PeHII t=(q1,...,qn)E [7: q=1=Vi>k jE{1,2,...,k,n) 
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t E Y pEn t = (q 1, ... , q n) E Y: q £ = 1 't/ i > k j E {I, 2, ... , k, n}
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PROOF. Since V(tlp) is continuous in both t and p, and since 7 and H are 
compact, the sup and inf are attained. Moreover 
(3) inf V(tlp) = minV(tIN=j), pElI H <n 
since V(tlp) is linear in p, and H is the set of all probabilities on {1, 2, . . ., n}. 
The proof of the optimality of the backward induction procedure implies 
that if t is any stopping time for an adapted sequence of a-algebras -1 C c C 
... c 9 and t* the optimal stopping time, then V(t') 2 V(t) if t' is obtain- 
ed from t by stopping at time i on an arbitrary Si-measurable subset 
of {t > i, t* = i}. Hence, by Proposition 2.2 replacing an arbitrary t = 
(ql,...,qn)ES 7 by f=(q1,...,qk,1,1,...,l)E 57 results in at least as 
high a probability of selecting the best object for any given (deterministic) 
number of objects (< n), that is, 
(4) V(tIN=j) 2 V(tIN=j) forall j < n. 
Together, (3), (4) and the compactness of 57 imply 
(5) sup inf V(tlp) = max minV(tIN =j). 
t GE ,- p GEpH t=(q1,. . . qn).E7:qi=1Vi>k j<n 
To complete the proof of the proposition, it is enough to show that for all 
t = (q19. .. ,qkg 1,... , 1) E_ I7, and for all j E- {k + 1, k + 29 ... n - 1}, 
(6) V(tIN=j) 2 min{V(tIN= k),V(tIN= n)}. 
Fix t = (q1, ... , qk, 1, ... ,1) E [0, 1]= and define real numbers {ai}in> as fol- 
lows: a, = q1 and ai = qi~lH-11(1 - m-lqm) for i > 1. 
Since qi = 1 for all i > k and qj E [0, 1] for all j, 
(7) am>am+l forallm>k. 
By Lemma 2.5, V(tIN =j) = (a, + * * +aj)/j for all j E {1,2,... , n}. To 
establish (6), suppose V(tIN = j) < V(tIN = k), that is, 
(8) (a, + *. +ak)/k ? (a, + +aj)lj. 
By (7) and (8) and Lemma 4.1 (with k = k)g 
V(tIN =j) = (a, + * D +aj)/j ? (a, + * ?+an)/n = V(tIN= n) , 
which establishes (6). a 
LEMMA 4.3. For all t= (q19 ... ., qk9 19 19 . .. , 1)E= A, 
V(tIN = n) = kn [(Sn-1 - Sk-)(1 - E (J + 1) V(tlN =j)) 
-(Sn-- Sk-1 -1)V(tlN = k). 
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PROOF. First it will be shown that 
i j-1 
(9) (1-m-lqm) - E (m + ? V(tlN= m) 
(9) m=l m=1 
-V(tIN=j) for all j k. 
The proof of (9) is by induction on j. For j = 1, (1 - q1) = 1 - V(tIN = 1) by 
Lemma 2.5. Assume that the equality in (9) holds for all j < k and calculate 
k+1 k k H (1 - mlqm) = 1 (1 - mlqm) - (k + 1) qk+l H (1 - mlqm) 
k-1 
= 1- ,(m + 1) - V(tlN = m) - V(tJN= k) 
(10) m=1 
where the second equality in (10) follows by the induction hypothesis and the 
fact (from Lemma 2.5) that 
V(tIN k + 1) = (ik + 1)1q~ H Ii (1 -m q 1 m) + 1(s + 1)t V(tIN =I), 
(m = 1 m=1 
which establishes (9). 
Since qj = 1 for all j > k, Lemma 2.5 and the definition of {sj} imply that 
- k i -1 
V(tlN- n) = n-1 E qi h (1 - m-lqm) 
+k(sn-1 - Sk-1) k (1 mlqm)J. 
But E =lqitlim 1(1 - m-lqm) = kV(tlN = k) (Lemma 2.5 again), so (9) (with 
j = k) and (11) yield the desired equality. m 
Heuristics. Although a direct calculus-based proof of Theorem B should be 
possible, the proof given below is greatly facilitated by Proposition 4.2 and 
Lemma 4.3, which both also serve as heuristics for the structure of the 
minimax-optimal stop rule. For example, Proposition 4.2 says that any general 
stop rule can be replaced by a stop rule with qi = 1 for all i > k, and that with 
such stop rules, the critical values occur when N = j for some j in 
{1, 2,..., k, n}; that is, if N = j e {k + 1.... , n - 1}, the observer's probabil- 
ity of selecting the best object is at least as high as the minimum of the other 
possible values for j. (Incidentally this also suggests why the minimax-optimal 
distribution in Theorem C places no mass on {k + 1, ... , n - 1}. For fixed t of 
the form known to be optimal (i.e., qi = 1 for all i > k), Lemma 4.3 implies 
( )
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that V(tIN = n) is a decreasing function of V(tIN = j) for j < k. Together 
with Proposition 4.2, this suggests via a "Robin Hood principle" (shifting 
mass to decrease the maximum and increase the minimum) that the extremal 
case occurs when V(tIN = 1) = V(tIN = 2) = * = V(tIN = k) = V(tIN = n). 
Solving this set of k equations for the k unknowns q1, . .. , qk leads to the 
minimax-optimal stop rule in Theorem B. Once the correct extremal stop rule 
is guessed, of course it is then much easier to prove directly that it is in fact 
optimal, without justifying the derivation of the guess. 
PROOF OF THEOREM B. By (6) it suffices to show that 
(12) V(t*lN =j) = a for j ={1 , 2 ,..., n}. 
To establish (12), first check by induction that q lHi-11(1 - m-lq,*) = a? for 
all j < k, so Lemma 2.5 implies that V(t *lN = j) = an for all j < k. To check 
that V(t *IN = n) = as, use Lemma 4.3 and the fact that (sn1 - skl) = 
k-lan(n - k)(1 - anSk)-1 to calculate 
V(tn*N= n) = n 1k[(Sn-1 - Skl)(11 -an A (j + 1)i) 
-(Sn-1 sk-1 - 1)an] 
= -k [(sn-1 
- 
Sk-1) (1 -an Ji) + an] 
= n1k[sank 1(n - k)(1 - anSkl) (1 - anSk) + an] = a?n ? 
5. Proof of Theorem C. As mentioned above, Proposition 4.2 suggests 
that any minimax-optimal (worst-case for the observer) distribution places no 
mass on {k + 1, ... , n - 1), and again a Robin Hood principle leads to a guess 
which has break-even values for each j in {1, 2,..., k, n}. For example, clearly 
Pr < a?, since otherwise taking t = (1 1 ..., 1) yields V(tlPn*) > an As was 
the case for the optimal stop rule, once a worst-case distribution Pn* has been 
guessed, the check that it is in fact minimax is then much easier. Thus most of 
the work was hidden in the heuristics which generated the guess for Pn*. 
FORMAL ARGUMENT. It is enough to show 
(13) V(tlPn*) < an for all t = (q9 *... , qk 1,1, * ... * 1) E H7 
since by (4), V((q1,... , qn)Ip) < V((q, ... , qk, 1,.. ., l)Ip) for all {qJ} E [0, 1] 
and all p Ei H. 
[In fact, it will be seen that (13). holds with equality throughout, which says 
intuitively that against Pn*, all "reasonable" stop rules, i.e., all stop rules with 
qi = 1 for all i > k, select the best object with the same probability.] 
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Fix t = (ql . . . qk, 1, 12 . .. X1) e [0, 1]n and calculate 
(k-1 1 i i-1 
V(tlPn*) = an E (j(j + 1)) E qj H (1 - mlqm) 
j=l i=i m=l 
k i-1 k 
+k1 E qj H (- m-lqm) + E (1 -m-lqm) 
i=1 m=i m=i 
k-1 k-1 i-i 
= anE E i1 - (j + 1)1)qi H (1 - m-1qm) 
k i-1 k 
+k 1 qj H (1 -m-lqm) + H (1 -m- qm) 
i=i m=i m=i 
k i-1 
= (i- -k-1)qi H (1 - m-lqm) 
z=1 ~m=l 
k i-1 k 
+k E qj H (1 -m-lqm) + H (1 - m-lqm) 
i=i m=i m=i 
k i-1 k 
= n Ei1qjj(1 - m1qm) + (1 - mlqm)j 
i=1 m=l m=l 
[k i-1 i-1 
= a[E (ijlqi - 1) fII (1 - m qm) + H (1 - mlqm)} 
i=1 m=l m=l 
k 
+ H (1 - m-lqm) 
m=i 
k i -1 
= n {H(i - m q ) - H (1 - m H qm)} 
i=1 m=l m=l 
k 
+ H1 (1 - m-lqm) m=i 
= aEng 
where the first equality follows by Lemma 2.5, the second since E I l = 
E*-1lE*i and the third since the first summand disappears for i = k. This 
completes the proof of (13) and the theorem. O 
6. Asymptotics. Since [In can be viewed as a subset of [nI n + 1, Theorem A 
shows, indirectly, that the sequence {an} is nonincreasing. A direct check using 
the definition of a n and general observations about k n (e.g., k n + 1 is either k n 
or kit + 1) shows that in fact the {an} are strictly decreasing in n. 
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Since sn log n and kn ne 1 (where an bn means limn a = 1), 
it follows easily that 
atn (log n) 
f (logn-logj)1 forj <e-1n, 
.7 1\ 1for j > e-1n 
and 
f ((j + 1)logn)1 for j < e-1n 
pJ* NO for e-1n <j < n, 
t2(log n) forj=n. 
In particular, lim n an = 0, in contrast to the well-known classical result 
that for the deterministic case N n, the probability of selecting the best 
object (using an optimal strategy) decreases monotonically to e-1 as n -* oc. 
The optimal "stopping-probabilities" {qji} are nondecreasing, which is also 
intuitively plausible, since if it is optimal to stop with a certain probability at 
time i (given R-i = 1), then at later times with even more information accrued 
it should be optimal to stop with at least as high as probability if a rank 1 
object is observed. 
The following alternative possible derivation of the asymptotic result an 
(log n) - 1 has been given by Samuels (1989). Since the expected number of 
relatively best ones ("records") will be about log N, this suggests that the rule 
stop with probability 1/log n at each of the first log n records will succeed with 
probability about 1/log n no matter what the distribution of N is. (A formal 
derivation using this approach seems to require more information about the 
actual distribution of the number of records than just its expectation.) 
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